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Purpose- The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of bank ownership structure and 
ownership concentration on credit risk.
Design/methodology/approach- Using panel data on a sample of 88 Chinese commercial 
banks with 1194 observations over a period of 2003-2018, this study employs system 
generalised method of moments regression to examine the impact of bank ownership structure 
and ownership concentration on credit risk. Two measures of credit risk, namely, non-
performing loan ratio and loan loss provision ratio are used to ensure the robustness of the 
results. 
Findings– The results show that ownership type (both government and private ownership) 
exert positive and significant impact on credit risk. However, our results indicate that 
ownership concentration in the hands of government has negative and significant effect on 
credit risk while private ownership concentration positively impacts on credit risk. Overall our 
findings suggest that concentration of ownership in government hands reduces risk, whilst 
private ownership concentration exacerbates credit risks. Our results are invariant to alternative 
measures of credit risk and financial crisis.
Practical implications – The findings provide useful insight to guide policy decisions in 
Chinese banks’ lending policies and b nk ownership. 
Originality/value– Using two ex-post measures of credit risk, non-performing loan ratio and 
loan loss provision ratio and one ownership concentration measure, Herfindahl-Hirchmann 
Index (HHI), this study deepens our understanding on the effectiveness of Chinese banks’ 
corporate governance reforms on managing credit risks.
JEL: G32 G34
Keywords: Credit Risk, Ownership Structure, Ownership Concentration, Non-Performing 
Loan Ratio, Loan Loss Provision Ratio
1. Introduction
Prior studies document that performance and risk-taking behaviours of firms are influenced by 
number of factors including the regulatory regime of particular industry, level of supervision 
within the firm, and the characteristics of the shareholders (Barry et al, 2011; John et al, 2008, 
Dong et al, 2014). Samet et al. (2018) contend that market discipline through increased bank 
regulation and supervision would curb excessive risk-taking propensity of the government 
owned banks (GOBs). Conversely, GOBs are likely to face political pressure that could lead to 
channelling of funds to finance projects with high social returns but high risk or to finance 
preferred groups (Clark et al., 2005 and Shliefer and Vishny, 1994). This argument is supported 
by grabbing hand theory which states that government owned firms are likely to serve the 
interests of politicians by appointing government bureaucrats as firm managers (see Shliefer 
and Vishny, 1994, 1998).  State owned banks may be unable to fight this risky government 
intrusion while the private owned banks are able to resist it and adopt more guarded lending 
practices (Shirley and Nellis, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In addition, lack of 
performance incentives and ‘soft’ budget constraints push state owned banks to take higher 
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risk and misallocation of resources (Shirley and Nellis, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The above theoretical contention appears consistent to some empirical evidences. On one hand, 
Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010); Iannotta et al (2007), (2013); Jia (2009); Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997); Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003) and Clark et al. (2005) document that government 
owned banks (GOBs) have higher credit risk and less prudent lending behaviours. They point 
out that the GOBs find it difficult to resist government interventions thereby leading to more 
risk-taking while privately owned banks (POBs) are more guarded in their lending practices 
and hence have lower credit risks (Shirley and Nellis, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). On 
the other hand, some studies have showed that state-controlled banks take lower risk in Russia 
(Fungáčová et al. 2013) and higher efficiency in India (Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay 1997) 
and Turkey (Isik and Hassan 2002). Overall the results are inconclusive and the role of 
controlling shareholders in credit risk decisions is largely under-researched in emerging 
markets.
In addition to ownership structure, another significant factor may affect banks’ performance 
and risk taking is ownership concentration1. Theoretical literatures have envisaged mixed 
impact of ownership concentration on firms’ performance. Some studies have suggested that 
concentrated ownership can mitigate free-rider problem and improve firm performance through 
better supervision of management (Shleifer and Vishny,1986 and Admati et al, 1994). The 
other line of thinking suggest that concentrated ownership can exacerbate agency problem as 
dominant shareholders could exercise control and reap personal gain at the expense of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In similar vein, empirical studies also documented mixed outcome in relation to ownership 
concentration and bank performance.  Laeven and Levine (2009) showed that banks with more 
powerful owners have propensity to take higher risks. Haw et. al. (2010) found that 
concentrated ownership lead to higher insolvency risk and greater return volatility for a sample 
of listed commercial banks in East Asia and Western Europe. Conversely, Shehzad et al. (2010) 
showed that volume of NPLs get reduced with ownership concentration of more than 50%. 
Similarly, Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008), found that ownership concentration 
leads to lower level of risk-taking in Spanish commercial bank and better loan quality, lower 
asset risk and a lower insolvency risk (Iannotta et al. 2007).
Despite the mixed results and conflicting arguments, prior studies on corporate governance 
have largely focused on non-financial firms. However, non-financial firms are different from 
financial firms in terms of transparency, regulation and business strategies (Mehran et al, 2011). 
Importantly, the few existing banking literatures in Chinese context have focused on the 
determinants of banks’ accounting performance or efficiency (see Berger et al, 2009; Fu and 
Heffernan, 2009, 2010; Kumbhakar and Wang 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Zhang et al, 2013). 
Relatively little attention has been given to ownership structure and their implications for bank 
risk taking behaviour in China. Yet, government participation in business activities through its 
ownership of firms while maintaining regulatory control may raise agency and political issues 
with implications for risk taking behaviour (Boateng, Yang and Brahma, 2019). Indeed, 
government ownership of banks is among the most important institutions in emerging countries 
and appears pervasive in Chinese banking industry (Boateng, Huang and Kufuor, 2015). It is 
therefore imperative that we investigate the effects of ownership structure on bank risk-taking 
1 Ownership concentration refers to the distribution of the ownership among different institutions and 
individuals and is related to shareholders' controlling power.
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in China.  The purpose of this study is twofold: (i) to examine the impact of ownership structure 
on bank credit risk (ii) to examine the impact of ownership concentration on bank credit risk. 
Employing a sample of 88 banks in China over the period 2003-2018, we examine the effects 
of ownership structure on credit risks proxies, namely NPLR and LLPR, utilizing the system 
GMM regression approach to overcome endogeneity concerns. 
The choice of China and Chinese banks appears appropriate setting to investigate this subject 
for the following reasons. First, Chinese banking sector has undergone significant reforms 
since 1979 that changed the ownership structure of these banks resulting in the two-tier 
ownership structure. Given these massive reforms in the Chinese banking sector, this study 
deepens our understanding on the effectiveness of Chinese banks’ corporate governance 
reforms on managing credit risks, which are measured by non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) 
and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR).  Second, similar to other emerging countries, China is 
marked by weak institutions and underdeveloped corporate governance system and 
government ownership of banks appears more pervasive (Du and Boateng, 2015; Singh and 
Gaur, 2009; Dahya et al., 2003). Du et al (2016) contend that the Chinese government actively 
intervenes in businesses as shareholder and economic manager to pursue social and political 
goals rather than maximisation of shareholder wealth which amplifies agency problems. In 
addition, political connections are ingrained in the institutional framework of several emerging 
economies with potential consequences on firm performance and risk-taking strategies (Chin 
et al., 2013; Grossman et al., 2016). These considerations led to the choice of China as an 
empirical setting for this study.
By way of preview, our results show that POBs tend to take more risk than GOBs. We also 
found that ownership concentration increases credit risk for POBs but reduce credit risk for 
GOBs. This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this study 
contributes to the literature of corporate governance in the banking sector by providing fresh 
evidence on the impact of both ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. 
Prior studies either focused on ownership structure (Barry et al., 2011; Forssbæck, 2011; 
Nichols et al., 2009) or on the degree of ownership concentration (Iannotta et al., 2013; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Sullivan and Spong, 2007). Second, given that emerging markets have 
restructured the corporate governance system over the past two decades, this study deepens our 
knowledge on the efficiency of bank boards in emerging markets particularly in the context of 
the growing Chinese banking sector. Third, this study provides new insight to agency theory 
by examining the effectiveness of corporate boards in their credit risk decisions, particularly 
those that are under government ownership and are likely to be influenced by political pressure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the institutional background. 
Section three discusses relevant literature and hypotheses of the study. The fourth section 
discusses the data collection and sample selection. Section five presents the research 
methodology and section size shows the main results. The final section summarises the study.
2. Institutional background
The Chinese authorities have restructured the Chinese banking sector over the past thirty years 
with the aim of making the banking sector that was policy-driven, wholly owned and 
monopolistic into market oriented and competitive institutions. This involved ushering of 
foreign investors, issuing of shares through the stock market and sell to domestic investors. 
This led to the creation of numerous classes of banking establishments that functioned in 
distinct market sectors. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) have categorized 
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the Chinese banks into wholly state-owned policy banks, large-scale (state-owned) commercial 
banks, joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs), rural 
commercial banks (RCBs), locally incorporated foreign banks, and other financial institutions.
Chinese banking sector is dominated by five largest commercial banks (known as Big Five): 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Bank of Communication (BOCOM). 
In 2003, the Chinese government adopted a partial privatization strategy through which some 
fractions of the shares of the Big Five were transferred to domestic and foreign institutions. 
However, the Chinese government retained the ultimate voting control and continued to 
exercise substantial sway over the administration and lending customs of these banks (Oliver 
et al. 2014; Dong et al. 2014). 
The JSCBs were created fairly recently compared to the SOCBs. Hence the JSCBs are not 
marred by historical lending practices specifically NPLs. As a result, JSCBs are more open to 
market conditions. JSCBs finance small and medium enterprises that are disregarded by the 
Big Five. Some JSCBs are owned by private investors like the China Minsheng Bank and China 
Zheshang Bank but the bulk is held by the SOEs (Lin and Zhang 2009; Dong et al. 2014).
The urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) were restructured and consolidated into city commercial 
banks (CCBs). Originally the CCBs were owned by local government to fund local economic 
development. CCBs were gradually transformed into joint-equity corporations with a 
diversified ownership including treasuries of local government, SOEs, private investors and 
foreign investors. In 2005, the CCB was listed on the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation  and raised $8 billion in the initial public offering (IPO). In 2006, the BOC had 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and raised about $9.7 billion. ICBC became 
the world’s largest bank by market value in 2007 by being listed on HKSE. The rural credit 
cooperatives were restructured in 2003, from policy driven rural businesses into market 
oriented urban ones by forming rural commercial banks (RCBs). 
In any corporate governance framework, the largest shareholders act as controlling 
shareholders and tend to exert substantial control rights by leading in the decision making 
process.  Hence in this study to examine bank risk taking and ownership structure we group 
the Chinese commercial banks into two types: government owned banks (GOBs) and privately 
owned banks (POBs). 
3. Hypothesis development
Barry et al. (2011) argue that agency costs and bank risk-taking may vary depending on the 
ownership structure. Empirical literatures have reported mixed results on ownership structure 
and bank risk taking. Theory suggests that dispersed ownership will increase bank risk taking 
(Galai and Masulis 1976; Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Demsetz and Lehn 1985). (Saunders 
et al. 1990) was the first empirical study on ownership structure and bank risk-taking. This 
study reported that managerial stock option increases risk-taking. In similar vein, Sullivan and 
Spong (2007) show that stock ownership by hired managers is positively linked with bank risk. 
Other studies reported either a negative relationship or U-shaped relationship between 
ownership structure and bank risk-taking (Gorton and Rosen 1995; Chen et al. 2009; Anderson 
and Fraser 2000). 
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As mentioned in the previous section, empirical literatures have documented mixed evidences 
between ownership concentration and bank risk- taking. Bouvatier et al.  (2014); Kiruri (2013); 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Anstoniadis (2010) and Kim et al. (2012) note that majority 
shareholders (i.e. top five shareholders) influence firms’ decision-making and strategy through 
their voting right. Several empirical literatures have used Herfindahl-Hirchmann Index (HHI) 
as the measure of ownership concentration2 (see Dong et al. 2014; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; 
Hou et al. 2013). HHI is the sum of the squared ownership of shares of top five shareholders 
following Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) and Chen et al. (2009). Cao et al. (2011) and Chen et 
al. (2009) show that top shareholders and their dominance is reflected on bank risk-taking 
behaviours. 
3.1 Government Owned Banks
In the context of Chinese commercial banks, the GOBs are characterised by politically 
connected boards (Boateng et al. 2019) as they generally serve as policy-lending conduits for 
the government to provide loans to SOEs or government investment (Oliver et al. 2014; Dong 
et al. 2014). Hence the GOBs may not adopt value maximising strategies. According to China 
Bank Regulatory Commission (2010), Chinese banks’ loans soared to a record RMB 9,590 
billion in 2009. In addition, the GOBs get financial and regulatory support from the government 
(Faccio et al. 2006). This government support also gives confidence to the GOBs to take higher 
credit risks. Hence, we advance the following hypotheses.
H1: Government ownership of banks in China is positively related to credit risk.
3.2 Privately Owned Banks
In the context of POBs’, their management would be more inclined towards lending activities 
that would increase the banks’ wealth as unlike GOBs which tend to pursue social goals. To 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, POBs would hire managers who have significant expertise in 
the banking sector. In addition, the POBs do not get government guarantees for their risk 
taking. Moreover, POBs’ management are monitored externally and could be subject to 
takeover in the market for corporate control. Hence managers of POBs would be more 
pragmatic in its lending decisions (Berglöf and Roland 1998; Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 
2003). Given these arguments we propose the following hypothesis.
H2: Private ownership of bank in China is positively related to credit risk.
3.3. Ownership Concentration
In this study, ownership concentration is measured by Herfindahl Hirchmann Index (HHI), 
which is the sum of the squared ownership shares of the top five shareholders. Bai et al. (2004), 
Busta et al. (2014) and Agusman et al. (2014) reported that ownership concentration impacts 
on organizational structure and decision-making. In emerging market context, the impact of 
ownership concentration appears severe where these banks are state owned and are politically 
connected. Prior studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 2002; Sapienza 2006) underscore this point and 
indicate that GOBs with a higher concentration are usually accompanied by political influences 
to achieve political and social objectives. 
2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is the sum of the squared ownership shares of the top five shareholders of 
the bank. 
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In the context of China, the strategies and operations of government-controlled banks are more 
likely to be the subject of political intervention and government support (Oliver et al. 2014; 
Dong et al. 2014). According to agency theory, a higher ownership concentration may easily 
lead to diversion of resources or credit to curtail credit risk and enhance lending activities 
(Cornett et al. 2010; Bonin et al. 2005; Fries and Taci 2005; Iannotta et al. 2007; 2013). This 
view is also supported by the empirical studies of Dong et al. (2014), Hou et al. (2016) and 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). In line with these arguments we propose the following hypothesis.
H3a: Ownership concentration is negatively related to credit risk for Chinese GOBs
Berger et al. (2009), Coffee (2001), Nguyen et al. (2015) and Tipurić et al. (2014) found that 
POBs with dispersed ownership face poor lending decisions thereby exacerbating the bank’s 
credit risk-taking behaviours. Shehzhad et al. (2010) in similar line documented that dispersed 
ownership leads to inefficient decision making. In Chinese context, Dong et al. (2014) and Lin 
and Zhang (2009) state that POBs with concentrated ownership lead to higher credit risk due 
to fewer political supports, higher profit goals and returns, asymmetrical loan information and 
less monitoring. The above empirical evidence suggests that concentrated ownership in the 
hands of private banks will increase credit risk (Berger et al. 2009; Coffee 2001; Tipurić et al. 
2014; Agusman et al. 2014). Hence we advance the following hypothesis.
H3b: Ownership concentration (HHI) is positively related to credit risk in Chinese POBs.
4.0 Sample and Data Sources 
The data is derived from the records of Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR), China Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China and the Bankscope database provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit 
Analysis Ltd). The initial sample totalled 127 Chinese banks. We imposed several restrictions 
to derive the final sample. First, only commericial banks, that is, city commercial banks, rural 
commercial banks and foreign banks are included. Consequently 12 policy banks are excluded 
because they may have different objectives rather than profitability. Second, 27 banks with 
missing data such as non-performing loans and other relevant data are excluded. The 
imposition of these restrictions led to the final usable sample of 88 banks and 1194 observations 
(i.e. 301 state-owned banks and 893 privately owned banks), covering the sixteen-year period 
from 2003 to 2018.  The data relating to the ownership structure of the banks were hand 
collected from the annual reports obtained from official website of the banks.
4.1 Measures of bank-risk taking
We employ two different risk measures as dependent variables and proxies for credit risk, 
namely, non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR). NPLR is the 
sum of total loans and leases over the past 90 days or more and non-accrual loans, divided by 
total amount of outstanding loans (Berger et al. 2009; Ghosh 2015). Following Lee and Chih 
(2013), Elnahass et al. (2014), we estimate the LLPR as loan loss provision (LLP) divided by 
net interest revenue (NIR). 
4.2 Measures of ownership concentration and ownership structure
This study has included two measures of ownership: ownership concentration and ownership 
structure. Both these measures include both the owners’ motivations and the authority of 
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shareholders. As mentioned earlier, ownership concentration is measured by HHI. This is 
measured as the sum of the squared ownership shares of the five largest shareholders of the 
banks. HHI is a robust measure and has been used extensively in other empirical studies to 
examine ownership concentration (Kim et al. 2012; Dong et al. 2014; Hou et al. 2013; Demsetz 
and Lehn 1985). To test ownership structure, we follow Agusman et al. (2014) and divide the 
sample into two types of banks (i.e. GOBs and POBs) to measure the effect of government 
intervention and credit decisions.
4.3 Control Variables
Following Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009), and Boateng et al. (2019) we control the 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables, namely, CEO total compensation (CEO_TC), 
gross domestic product rate (GDPR), inflation rate (INFR), unemployed rate (UNEMP), bank 
leverage ratio (LEVR) and bank size (SIZE). Fries and Taci (2005) showed that gross domestic 
product (GDP) is an indicator of economic performance and in turn plays a role in bank’s 
lending policies. Ghosh (2015) advanced that inflation rate has negative impact on the real 
income of borrowers. The macroeconomic variables are closely related to risk-taking 
behaviours and banks’ credit decisions (Grigorian and Manole 2002; Fries and Taci 2005; 
Ghosh 2015). Fu and Hefferman (2009) documented that unemployment rate increases default 
risk and thereby leads to rise in NPLs and loan loss reserves.
Luo and Ying (2014) and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) observed that bank size is positively 
related to loan portfolio and default rates. In similar vein, Sapienza (2006) documented that 
bank size may also influence the ability to take and absorb risk. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
reported that CEO compensation is positively linked to firm risk taking. Hence in this study 
we have controlled total compensation. Table 1 presents the definition of the variables.
Insert Table 1
The summary statistics of the variables are shown in table 2. In the context of the dependent 
variables the mean NPLR is 2.35 and the mean LLPR is 0.72. The mean coefficient of 
ownership concentration is 0.1027. This result is similar to Dong et al. (2014). The mean value 
of GOVBANK is a higher 73.53%, indicating that state-owned shares are very high in the 
Chinese GOBs, and also implying that the GOBs have a higher ownership concentration and 
shareholder controlling rights. This means that the Chinese government intervention would 
have significant impact on the lending activities of GOBs. On the other hand, the mean value 




Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables. A correlation 
of 0.7 in absolute value or higher may indicate multicollinearity. All the variables have 
correlation coefficient that is lower than 0.7. This study has also reported the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and the results suggest that all the VIFs are well below 4.0 and hence 
multicollinearity is absent.
Insert Table 3
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5. Empirical approach and model
To examine the impact of ownership concentration and ownership structure on bank risk-taking 
we apply a model in a dynamic framework as adopted by several empirical studies of corporate 
governance and bank risk-taking (see Dong et al. 2014). Specifically, we have applied two-
step system generalized method of moments (SGMM) approach by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) as our main estimation technique to estimate equations 1 and 2 
following Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and Dong et al. (2014). This method treats all the 
explanatory variables as endogenous and orthogonally use the past values as their 
corresponding instruments. The reliability of SGMM has been checked using Hansen’s test for 
instrument validity. The purpose of using the two-step system SGMM is to account for 
endogeneity that may affect the variables. The SGMM estimator use internal instruments that 
are obtainable within the panel itself (Blundell & Bond 1998). Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
advanced that the SGMM is the best-performing estimator within common data features that 
are present in our dataset: (i) short panel; (ii) endogenous explanatory variables; and (iii) 
dynamic panel bias. The models are specified as follows:
                      (1) 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 +𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
                       (2) 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 +𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
In equations 1 and 2, subscripts i denote the Chinese banks and t is the time period. The 
coefficients  are the parameters to be estimated and  represent the disturbance term. CRisk 𝛽𝑗 𝜀
represents the two measures of credit risks that are applied in this study, which are non-
performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR). The set of explanatory 
variables: GOVBANK, PRIBANK and HHI represent the Chinese GOBs, POBs and degree of 
ownership concentration respectively. Following La Porta et al. (2002) and Luo and Ying 
(2014), the independent variables GOVBANK represents the banks where the state-owned 
share proportion is more than 50% and PRIBANK represents privately owned banks where 
more than 50% of the controlling shareholders are private entities (including foreign legal 
person) or individuals. The HHI equals the sum of the squared ownership shares of the five 
largest shareholders of the bank (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hou et al. 2013). The higher the 
HHI, higher is the ownership concentration. The control variables are macroeconomic 
variables: gross domestic product rate (GDPR), unemployment rate (UNEMP), inflation rate 
(INFR) and bank characteristics variables: bank size (SIZE) and bank leverage ratio (LEVR). 
6.  Results and Discussions
6.1 Ownership structure and credit risk
Table 4 reports our regression results using two dependent variables, namely, NPLR and LLPR 
as proxies for credit risk. Our results suggest that government owned banks as shown in model 
2 has coefficient which is positive and significant at 1% indicating that government ownership 
increases bank credit risk. The results provide support the hypothesis H1. The results may be 
explained by the fact that GOBs are characterised by politically connection thereby increasing 
credit risk as loans may be channelled to SOEs for social objectives instead of commercial 
activities making it difficult for SOEs to repay the loans. The findings appear consistent with 
empirical studies by Boateng et al. (2019), Oliver et al. (2014) and Dong et al. (2014). With 
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regard to the POBs, the results in table 4 show that credit risk measured by both NPLR and 
LLPR (models 3 and 4) exhibit a positive and significant relationship with privately owned 
banks. Hypothesis 2 is therefore not supported. The results appear surprising in that privately- 
owned banks tend to be more efficient diligent in assessing credit risk associated with firms 
before granting loans but this appears not be the case. Perhaps, the results may be due to poor 
institutions and weak monitoring thereby increasing credit risk.
6.2 Ownership concentration and credit risk
Regarding the ownership concentration measured by HHI, the results reported in Table 4 
indicate that the coefficient for GOBs in models 5 and 6 is negative and significant at 1% level. 
The results suggest that ownership concentrated in the hands of government reduce credit risk 
measured by both NPLR and LLPR. The results provide support for hypothesis H3a. The 
results may be explained by the fact that government monitoring may be more effective when 
share ownership is concentrated in the hands of government thereby reducing credit risk. The 
results are consistent with empirical evidences by Shehzad et. al. (2010) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), that concentrated ownership boosts effectiveness of corporate governance. 
For POBs, ownership concentration is positive and significant for both measures of credit risk 
in models 7 and 8. Hypothesis H3b is therefore supported. The results suggest that ownership 
concentrated in the hands of private banks exacerbate bank credit risk-taking behaviours. This 
may be due to poor monitoring as private banks may not be able to attract directors with high 
level of skills and experience to serve on the board compared to government owned banks 
thereby weakening the monitoring role and increasing credit risk. This result is consistent with 
the studies by Berger et. al.  (2009); Coffee (2001); Tipurić et. al. (2014) and Agusman et. al. 
(2014).
Regarding control variables, our regression results indicate that the coefficients for GDP and 
unemployment to have a positive and significant effect on credit risk while inflation rate, bank 
size and leverage are negatively related to credit risk.
(Insert Table 4 here)
6.3 Interaction of ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk
We further analyse the effect of ownership concentration on credit risk by examining the effects 
of interaction of ownership concentration and ownership type (HHI*GOVBANK and 
HHI*PRIBANK). As Table 5 shows the coefficient of interaction variable (HHI*GOVBANK) 
is negative and significant at 1% for both measures of credit risk, NPLR and LLPR. These 
results indicate that level of ownership concentration interacts with ownership type to improve 
corporate governance and lending practices and consequently reduce credit risk. Therefore, 
ownership concentration and ownership type matter for credit risks. The appear consistent with 
the studies by Agusman et al. (2014) and Iannota et al. (2007). The interaction term of 
HHI*PRIBANK is positive and significant at 1% for both measures of credit risk. These results 
corroborate our findings in table 4 that block holders in POBs appear to weaken the monitoring 
role of the board and exacerbate credit risks. 

































































The financial crisis in 2009 affect the lending and risk-taking activities of the banks worldwide. 
To rule out that the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 is not driving our results, we run further 
regression analysis excluding the period of financial crisis, and use the following sample 
periods (2003-2006 and 2010-2014). Our results remain similar to our main results reported in 
Table 4. 
(Insert Table 5 here)
7. Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of ownership structure and ownership concentration and 
further investigates the effects of interaction between ownership structure and ownership 
concentration on credit risk of Chinese banks from 2003-2018. Despite a number of studies 
investigating the influence of ownership structure, virtually, relatively few studies have 
examined how both ownership type, ownership concentration and the interaction between the 
two, affect credit risk measured by both NPLR and LLPR. Previous studies by Dong et al. 
(2014) on China and Barry et al. (2011) on European commercial banks have looked into firm 
risk-taking measured primarily by z-score. While z-score is a measure of ex-ante probability 
of default, NPLR and LLPR are direct ex-post measures of credit risk (Srairi 2013). A high 
value of NPLR and LLPR will result in losses for the bank and hence they are direct measures 
of credit risk (Delis and Kouretas 2011). In this study, we take up this issue by extending prior 
research on the relationship between ownership structure and direct measures of credit risk in 
an emerging market environment where corporate governance systems are weak. Employing a 
panel data approach and SGMM to mitigate the endogeneity problem, this study reports a 
number of interesting findings. 
First, our results suggest that ownership type (both government and private ownership) exert 
positive and significant impact on credit risk. An important policy implication of this study is 
that Chinese government should introduce more stringent regulations on lending policies of 
the banks. Lastly, our result also shows that an increase in ownership concentration in POBs 
weakens monitoring role of the board while concentration in the hands of government 
strengthens the bank credit monitoring. The results imply that government banks appear to be 
effective monitors compared to private owned banks. Despite the contribution of this study 
regarding the effect of ownership structure, ownership concentration and their interaction on 
credit risk, further research is warranted. Future research should conduct a comparative study 
of these relationships by undertaking a cross-country study.
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Table 1 Definitions of the variables
Variables Measurement Definition Type Exp.Sign Source
Dependent Variable: Credit Risk (CR)
Non-Performing Loan 
Ratio (NPLR)
NPLR= non-performing loans /total loans (Berger et 
al., 2009; Ghosh 2015)
An index is measured by the response 
of credit loss, reflecting a deterioration 
of banks’ balance sheets and asset 
quality.
Bank specific + Bank 
scope
Loan Loss Provision 
Ratio (LLPR)
Ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue 
(LLPR = Loan Loss Provision (LLP) / Net Interest 
Revenue (NIR)) (Ghosh, 2015; Nguyen and Boateng, 
2015; Hauner, 2008; Merton, 1974; Black and 
Scholes, 1973; Lee and Chih, 2013)
An index is measured credit quality by 
using the provision to decrease loan 
loss and lease losses-to-total loans
Bank specific + Bank 
scope
Independent Variables: Bank Type (Type-Specific Variables)
The state-owned share 
proportion of government 
ownership of banks 
(GOVBANK)
Government ownership of banks (GOBs) is defined as banks 
where more than 50 percent of shares are owned by the 
government (La Porta et al., 2002; Luo and Ying, 2014; 
Dong et al., 2014).
An index variable that measures the 
proportion of shares held by the 
government.
Bank specific -/+ Bank 
scope
The privately owned 
share proportion of 
private ownership of 
banks (PRIBANK)
Private ownership of banks (POBs) is defined as banks 
where more than 50 percent of shares are owned by the 
private firms (La Porta et al., 2002; Luo and Ying, 2014; 
Dong et al., 2014).
An index variable that measures the 
proportion of shares held by individual and 
private firms.




Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted 
measure of market concentration which we have measured as 
the sum of the squared ownership shares of the top five 
shareholders of the bank (Dong et al., 2014; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Hou et al., 2013).
An index variable that measures a market 
concentration by testing the percentage of 
the allocated shares of top five 
shareholders to a total number of shares.
Bank specific +/- Bank 
scope




Log of CEO compensation (Acrey et al., 2011; 
Borisova et al., 2012; Luo and Ying, 2014; Coles et 
al., 2008; Griffith et al., 2002)
An index variable that expresses the 
amount of real CEO total 
compensation (e.g. salary, stock return, 
and equity)
Bank specific - Bank 
scope
GDP Growth Rate 
(GDPR)
GDP growth of China that is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the annual Gross Domestic Products 
growth (International Monetary Fund (IMF); De 
Bondt, 1999; Nguyen and Boateng, 2013; 2015; 
Ghosh, 2015; Fosu, 2014)
An index is captured by the credit 
demand effect and control for the 
balance sheet channel effect where the 
fall in the borrowers’  net worth leads 
to the decrease in bank credit supply.
Macroeconomic - NBSC
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Unemployed Rate 
(UNEMP)
Unemployed-to-labor force (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China(NBSC) (Fu and Heffernan, 2009; 
Ghosh, 2015; Fosu, 2014)
An index shows that its value 
measures the ability of profitability 
within a bank
Macroeconomic + NBSC
Inflation Rate (INFR) Inflation is measured by the natural logarithm of 
annual CPI(National Bureau of Statistics of 
China(NBSC) (Fu and Heffernan, 2009; Ghosh, 2015; 
Barth et al., 2009)
An index refers as the level of default 
rates within a bank
Macroeconomic - NBSC
Panel B Bank characteristic index
Bank Size (SIZE) BSit= logAit-(∑i=1NlogAit/Nt)
Logarithm of the total assets (Gambacorta, 2005; 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Ghosh, 2015)
An index is reflected a bank’s total 
asset that resorts to the range of 
excessive risk taking.
Bank specific + CSMAR
Bank Leverage Ratio 
(LEVR)
BLR=Equity/Liability (The World Bank Group; 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Nguyen and Boateng, 2013; 
2015; D’Hulster, 2009)
An index denotes its capital as 
proportion of total adjusted assets in a 
bank
Bank specific + CSMAR





























































International Journal of Managerial Finance
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max Median
NPLR(%) 1194 2.3541 5.1957 0.01 99.3 1.34
LLPR (%) 1194 0.7206 7.5390 -8.378 192.6 0.0085
HHI 1194 0.1027 0.1517 0.02655 1 0.0557
GOVBANK(%) 301 0.7353 0.1513 0.5024 1 0.7206
PRIBANK(%) 893 0.1879 0.1351 0 0.4993 0.175
GDPR(%) 1194 8.9141 2.2229 6.6 14.2 7.75
UNEMP(%) 1194 4.0790 0.1182 3.8 4.3 4.1
INFR(%) 1194 2.5844 1.8869 -0.7 5.9 2.6
LEVR(%) 1194 6.4565 3.6859 -20.794 45.66 6.23
SIZE(%) 1194 11.5950 2.4663 1.8825 25.6136 11.3007
Note: This table presents that descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises 88 banks in China and 1194 observations during the period of 2003-2018. The Non-
performing Loan Ratio (NPLR) is the proportion of non-performing loans to total loans; Loan Loss Provision Ratio (LLPR) is the proportion of loan loss provision to net 
interest revenue (NIR). Explaining variables and control variables are indicators capturing the quality governance defined in detail in Subsection 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. GOVBANK 
is the state-owned share proportion of government-controlled banks which is more than 50%. PRIBANK is privately owned banks which is more than 50%. Growth GDP 
(GDPR); Unemployment (UNEMP); Inflation (INFR) and Leverage (LEVR).
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Table 3 Correlation matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 VIF
1.NPLR 1.000 1.09
2.LLPR -0.023 1.000 1.28
3.GOVBANK 0.234***     -0.159*** 1.000 1.14
4.PRIBANK 0.008 -0.082** 0.000 1.000 1.12
5.HHI 0.019 0.001 0.221*** -0.238*** 1.000 1.19
6.GDPR 0.135*** -0.012 0.104 0.028 -0.018 1.000 1.23
7.UNEMP 0.113***   0.027 0.040 0.007 0.004 0.309*** 1.000 1.14
8.INFR -0.014 -0.006 -0.067 -0.011 -0.027 0.370*** 0.141*** 1.000 1.18
9.LEVR -0.149***  -0.018 -0.267*** -0.098**     -0.088** -0.055*     -0.010  0.056* 1.000 1.22
10.SIZE -0.012 -0.265***  0.088 -0.010 0.275*** -0.182*** -0.045 0.064* -0.065* 1.000 1.39
Note: * denotes p < 0.05, ** denotes p < 0.01, *** denotes p < 0.001. VIF(Variance Inflation Factor, VIF): the degree of collinearity in explanatory variable. The result presents  
how much of the inflation of the standard error could be produced by multicollinearitys. Tolerance(Tol): it shows how much collinearity that a regression analysis can tolerate. 
In fact, the corresponding VIF is simply 1/tolerance.  On average, both the tolerance and VIF are 1. If a variable is very closely related to another variable(s), the tolerance goes 
to 0, and the variance inflation gets very large. A tolerance value lower than 0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 10. It means that the variable could be considered as a linear 
combination of other independent variables. 
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Table 4 System GMM results 
NPLR LLPR NPLR LLPR NPLR LLPR NPLR LLPR













GDPR -1.546 -6.546 4.197*** 0.199*** 0.0208 41.84** 0.750*** 0.419***
 (-0.68) (-1.61) (32.78) (22.66) (0.20) (2.18) (3.51) (2.51)
UNEMPR 0.170 -34.90 46.56*** 1.278*** -0.104 172.5* 11.51*** 41.22***
 (0.01) (-0.92) (38.08) (48.06) (-0.11) (1.66) (3.04) (25.56)
INFR -928*** -0.369     -0.422*** -0.293*** -0.274*** 2.935     -0.0490 -0.104***
 (-2.34) (-0.54) (-21.92) (-200.17) (-9.82) (1.11) (-1.35) (-13.51)
LEVR 0.654 0.199 -1.425*** -0.0792*** -0.218** 12.58 -0.730*** -4.607***
 (1.40) (0.19) (10.06) (-21.00) (2.20) (1.45) (-4.73) (-144.59)
SIZE -4.358 1.594 -2.508*** -0.984*** -2.856*** 174.3*** -7.021*** -11.79***
 (-0.81) (0.21) (-10.62) (-15.28) (-3.42) (3.28) (-5.55) (-50.29)
_cons -64.46*** 1.646***     -69.44*** 0.909*** -64.46*** 1.646***      6.361 66.10***
 (-13.49) (3.59) (-40.87) (6.00) (-13.49) (3.59) (0.82) (22.12)
N/N_g 160/29 160/29 450/72 450/72 479/76 481/76 450/72 450/72
Artests 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
AR(1) -1.126 -0.999 -1.086 -1.114 -1.126 -0.516 -1.077 -0.188
AR(2) -0.879 -0.261 -0.679 1.004 0.879 0.313 -0.193 -1.189
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan 20.20*** 24.27*** 22.70*** 24.35*** 20.20*** 24.27*** 48.50*** 45.79***
Note: t statistics in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The table reports empirical results from estimating Eq.(1), (2). In addition, column 2, 3, 4 and 5 reports 
the results obtained from two dependent variables with clustering at the bank level, respectively. The two-step system GMM approach is reported in parentheses and based on  
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Year dummies and ownership type dummies are unreported. The Arellano-Bond test is for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
and first-order serial correlation, but no second-order serial correlation in the residuals (Arelano and Bond 1991). The Sargan test justifies the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions. 
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Table 5 System GMM results (Interaction of ownership structure and ownership concentration)
NPLR LLPR NPLR LLPR

















GDPR 3.920*** 0.175*** 0.540** 1.875***
 (10.95) (425.83) (2.34) (12.12)
UNEMPR 41.56*** 1.277*** 9.911*** 53.47***
 (14.19) (48.05) (3.31) (27.51)
INFR -0.438*** -0.256*** -0.137*** 0.0722***
 (-23.85) (-763.10) (-4.34) (6.18)
LEVR -1.417*** -0.0526*** -0.741*** -4.616***
 (-8.31)  (-321.79)  (-5.49) (-84.89)
SIZE -1.337*** -0.256*** -4.675*** -12.29***
 (-2.80) (-372.00) (-4.13)   (-55.00)
_cons -64.86*** 0.910*** -2.465 92.16***
 (-27.99) (6.00) (-0.37) (27.19)
N/N_g 160/29 160/29 481/76 481/76
Artests 2 2 2 2
AR(1) -1.223 -1.114 -1.082 -0.442
AR(2) -0.865 1.004 -0.261 -1.150
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan 20.70 *** 24.36*** 34.64 *** 47.98 ***
Note: t statistics in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The table reports empirical results from estimating Eq.(1), (2). In addition, column 2, 3, 4 and 5 reports 
the results obtained from two dependent variables with clustering at the bank level, respectively. The T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Year dummies and ownership 
type dummies are unreported. The Arellano-Bond test is for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors and first-order serial correlation, but no second-order serial correlation 
in the residuals (Arelano and Bond 1991). The Sargan test justifies the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. 





























































International Journal of M
anagerial Finance
Title of the paper: Impact of Ownership Structure and Ownership Concentration on Credit 
Risk of Chinese Commercial Banks
Page 25 of 25 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
